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The attacks of September 11, 2002, have dramatically al-
tered the policy andscape in Washington, but it is impor-
tant to reject the notion that there is a necessary trade-off
between security and civil liberties. One of the most seri-
ous threats to civil liberties has been the adoption of a pol-
icy of preventive detention that has resulted in the secret
jailing of hundreds of Arabs and Muslims when there is
no evidence linking them to terrorist activity. This has
been done, not by using the limited new authorities
granted the government in the post-September 11 terror-
ism legislation, but by improperly using pre-existing crimi-
nal and immigration authorities. Secret arrests are
antithetical to a democratic society. A targeted investiga-
tion that focuses on actual terrorist activity and respects
the legitimate political and religious activity of citizens
and non-citizens would be more effective than a dragnet
approach that has resulted in the secret arrests of hun-
dreds of individuals.
Résumé
Les attentats du 11 septembre ont changé de façon
dramatique le paysage politique à Washington. Néan-
moins, il importe de rejeter la notion que pour obtenir la
sécurité, il faut nécessairement sacrifier les libertés civiles
en échange. Ainsi, une des atteintes les plus sérieuses con-
tre les libertés civiles a été l’adoption d’une politique de
détention préventive, qui a permis la détention au secret
de centaines de ressortissants Arabes et de musulmans
malgré qu’il n’existe aucune preuve les liant aux activités
terroristes. Ceci a été accompli non pas en appliquant les
pouvoirs limités donnés au gouvernement par les lois
anti-terroristes adoptées après le 11 septembre, mais en
évoquant, à tort, des pouvoirs préexistants dans le do-
maine du criminel et de l’immigration. Les arrestations
secrètes constituent l’antithèse même d’une société
démocratique. Par contre, une enquête ciblée se concen-
trant sur des activités terroristes réelles et menée dans le
respect des activités religieuses et politiques des citoyens et
des non citoyens, serait bien plus efficace que l’approche
d’une drague ratissant large et qui a abouti à l’arresta-
tion secrète de centaines d’individus.
I
begin this paper by noting that since September 11 there
has been a fundamental change in perspective in Wash-
ington, D.C. It is now considered a real possibility that
a small nuclear device will be set off in some American city
and that possibility underlies the discussions about the dif-
ficult problems of what do we do now. If a small nuclear
device were to be set off, the pressure to suspend the Bill of
Rights would be overwhelming. We civil libertarians could
argue that it would be not only an inappropriate, but an
ineffective and irrelevant, response to that event; but I have
little confidence that we could prevent it if there were a
nuclear attack or explosion somewhere in the United States.
I begin also with the recognition that there is a crucial
responsibility on the part of the United States government
to prevent terrorist attacks. At the same time, I reject the
notion that there is some necessary trade-off between civil
liberties, human rights and constitutional procedures on
the one hand, and security on the other.

While many in the United States have cast the terrible
situation we find ourselves in today as one in which we must
decide what liberties we are willing to sacrifice for an in-
creased measure of safety, I believe that is neither an accu-
rate nor a helpful analysis. Before asking what trade-offs are
constitutional, we must ask what gain in security is accom-
plished by restrictions on civil liberties. It is only by forcing
the government to articulate how each particular restric-
tion will contribute to security that we can have any assur-
ance  that the steps  being taken will in fact be  effective
against terrorism. Unfortunately, this has not been the
approach of the U.S. government to date.
Rather than outline all of the domestic measures taken
by the United States government since September 11 that
have raised questions about threats to civil liberties, I will
concentrate on a subject that is of interest from a compara-
tive perspective looking at Canada and the United States:
the government’s use of preventive detention in the fight
against terrorism.
Since September 11 we have witnessed an extraordinary
shift in rhetoric by the Attorney General. The Attorney
General, although the chief law enforcement officer in the
United States, no longer speaks of the activities of the
Department of Justice in terms of law enforcement; that is,
investigating planned or committed crimes with the objec-
tive of prosecuting individuals for criminal activity and the
secondary objective of preventing crime. Attorney General
Ashcroft now speaks almost exclusively about prevention
and disruption of terrorism.1
Before September 11 there was an unquestioned and
virtually universal understanding in the United States that
individuals could be jailed prior to being convicted of a
crime or prior to being found deportable in violation of the
immigration laws only upon an individualized showing
before some judicial officer that he or she posed either a risk
of flight or a danger to the community if released on bond.
That understanding was based in the constitutional guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights, including the Sixth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against excessive bail; the protections
against imprisonment without probable cause of criminal
activity, found in the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
unreasonable seizures; and the Fifth Amendment’s prohi-
bition of deprivations of liberty without due process of law.
In the Patriot Act and since September 11 there has been a
dramatic erosion of that basic principle.
The USA Patriot Act
Eight days after September 11, the Bush Administration sent
a draft anti-terrorism bill to Congress that became the USA
Patriot Act. Unlike what happened in Canada, the anti-ter-
rorism bill was not drafted in response to the attacks, but
instead contained many individual amendments to many
different statutes giving the government new authorities it
had long been seeking. Many of the provisions are in fact
unrelated to terrorism; for example, the Act authorizes se-
cret executions of search warrants in all criminal cases.2
In the week following September 11, the administration
urged the Congress to pass the bill immediately and without
making any changes. Many civil liberties groups, and some
courageous members of Congress, urged the administra-
tion to separate out those authorities it needed immediately
to fight terrorism and to consider the rest of the authorities
in the usual legislative process. The administration refused
to do so and repeated its earlier demands to pass the entire
bill. When Congress had not passed the bill within two
weeks, the Attorney General and the Republican leadership
in the Congress publicly warned that further terrorist at-
tacks were imminent and implied that, if these new powers
were not authorized, those attacks would be the fault of the
Democrats in Congress.3 Congress could not withstand that
political pressure and both houses of Congress passed the bill
by October 12. It was signed into law on October 26, 2001.
In the Patriot Act, the administration specifically sought
the authority for indefinite preventive detention of non-
citizens on the sole say-so of the Attorney General. The
initial administration bill provided that non-citizens could
be detained simply on the certification of the Attorney
General that he believed an individual might be a terrorist.
It contained no limits on the how long an individual could
be detained and specifically stated that the substantive basis
for the Attorney General’s certification that an individual
was a terrorist would not be subject to judicial review. That
proposal applied only to non-citizens and was the subject
of the greatest public controversy during consideration of
the bill. Negotiations with the administration did produce
some safeguards in the final law.
The final law provided that the Attorney General’s certi-
fication that a non-citizen is a threat to national security can
only justify detention without charges initially for seven
days.4 At the end of those seven days, the non-citizen must
either be charged under the criminal law or immigration
proceedings must be initiated against that individual and
his continued detention would presumably have to be on
the basis of such charges. However, at the far end of the
adjudicative process, the new law contains no protections.
Even if one is found not deportable under the immigration
laws and has the right to remain in the United States, the
Attorney General at that point can certify the individual as
a threat to national security and detain him in jail indefi-
nitely  subject to recertification  every six months.5 That
provision arguably conflicts with the recent Supreme Court
ruling that aliens who have been found deportable, but
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whom no country is willing to accept, may not be jailed
indefinitely.6
The President’s Military Order Authorizing
Detentions and Military Trials
On November 13, the President issued a military  order
authorizing the creation of military commissions to try
suspected terrorists. The order also claimed unilateral
authority to detain indefinitely non-citizens deemed terror-
ists by the President.7 The order applied to any non-citizens
found either within the United States or abroad. The Presi-
dent directed the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations
implementing the order.
The authorization in the order for detaining aliens inside
the United States believed by the President to be involved
in terrorism was an end-run around the provisions of the
USA Patriot Act concerning such detentions. The Act had
limited the conditions under and period for which indi-
viduals may be detained, but then the President’s order
purported to authorize what the Congress had rejected in
the first administration draft of the anti-terrorism bill. It
was criticized as a deliberate end-run around the limits and
restrictions agreed to by the administration in negotiating
the detention provisions of the Patriot Act.
Indeed, all parts of the order were widely criticized by
members of Congress, law professors, civil liberties groups,
and others on the grounds that it set up an unconstitutional
system of secret military trials and illegal detention. Since
the public outcry, the authority has not been used. The
government brought terrorism-related charges against two
individuals in federal court rather than transferring them
to military authorities. On December 11, 2001, the Justice
Department indicted Zacarias Moussaoui for conspiracy in
the September 11 attacks, describing him as the “twentieth
hijacker.” It similarly indicted the “shoe bomber,” the in-
dividual arrested on a plane headed for Boston and charged
with having explosives in his shoes.
On March 21, 2002, the Department of Defense finally
issued regulations implementing the President’s military
order. While the regulations set up procedures for trials by
military commissions, they make no reference to the
authority to detain individuals under the order.8 It is not
clear whether the government’s current view is that the
detention authority claimed in the President’s order applies
only to authorize pretrial detention of individuals who are
to be tried by military tribunals, or to anyone the govern-
ment wants to detain as a suspected terrorist.
Secret Detentions
While the administration demanded and received new pow-
ers in the USA Patriot Act to detain non-citizens indefinitely
on the grounds that such authority was urgently needed to
counter an imminent terrorist threat, those new statutory
powers have not been used since then.9 Nevertheless, the
government has embarked on a policy of massive preventive
detention using pre-existing authorities in questionable and
unconstitutional ways to jail hundreds of people for months.
In the first few days after the attacks some seventy-five
individuals were detained. While the administration was
seeking increased authority from the Congress to detain
non-citizens, it picked up hundreds more individuals. On
November 5, the Department of Justice announced that
1,182 people had been detained as part of its investigation
into the September 11th attacks. In the face of increased
public questioning, the Department has refused to give out
any more information about the numbers since then.10
While trumpeting the number of arrests in an apparent
effort to reassure the public, the Department of Justice
refused to provide the most basic information about who
had been arrested and on what basis. It refused to give the
names of any individuals who were arrested or to provide
the charges that were brought against  them. The exact
details of this policy of preventive detention are not yet
clear, because even as of today, the names of those arrested
are secret. In the face of congressional and public pressure,
the Department of Justice has released the names of some
one hundred people who were detained as part of its Sep-
tember 11 investigation and then charged with federal
criminal offenses. Only one of them was charged with
conspiracy related to the September 11 attacks.11
In addition, the government released a list of 718 non-
citizens who had been detained by the government on
immigration violations as of January 11, 2002. Their names
are blacked out, as are the locations where they were ar-
rested and are being held.12 The government announced
that as of April 30, 104 of those individuals are still in
custody.13
This limited information was released in response to a
lawsuit brought by the Center for National Security Studies
and twenty other organizations challenging the secrecy of
the  detentions.14 They are suing under  the Freedom  of
Information Act, common law, and the First Amendment
to obtain the names of the jailed individuals, where they are
being held, and on what basis.15
There is no existing legal authority for keeping arrests
secret. The government has defended its refusal to release
the names on the grounds, first, that to do so would harm
its terrorism investigation, even though by its own admis-
sion, almost half of the detained individuals “are not of
current interest to the investigation.” It has also claimed
that it is withholding the names out of concern for the
detainees’ privacy.16 The government’s papers fail to ex-
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plain how releasing the names of those it has jailed will
harm its terrorism investigation, as it is clear that it has no
evidence linking the vast majority of those individuals with
terrorism in any way.
The plaintiff organizations have pointed to numerous
press reports which, if accurate, raise serious questions as
to whether the rights of the detainees are being violated.
Public disclosure of the names of those arrested and the
charges against them is essential to assure that individual
rights are respected and to provide public oversight of the
conduct and effectiveness of this crucial investigation. Pub-
lic scrutiny of the criminal justice system is key to ensuring
its lawful and effective operation. Democracies governed by
the rule of law are distinguished from authoritarian socie-
ties because in a democracy the public knows who has been
arrested. Here, there have been numerous credible reports
of violation of the right to assistance of counsel, violation
of the right to have the consulate of one’s country notified
when arrested, imprisonment without probable cause and
in violation of the constitutional right to be free on bail
prior to trial, and beatings and other abuses by jail guards.
It is ironic that the government’s claim to respect the pri-
vacy of the detainees apparently is shielding violations of
their rights.
In addition to keeping secret the names of those whom
it has jailed, the government has adopted a blanket policy
closing the immigration hearings to the press, the public,
and even the families of all of those individuals picked up
on immigration violations in the terrorism investigation.
Instead of providing for individualized determinations as
to the necessity for a particular hearing to be closed or for
particular evidence to be heard in a closed hearing, the
policy simply commanded that all hearings would be
closed, even over the objections of the detainees who wished
to have their hearings pubic, without consideration of the
nature of the charges or the evidence to be offered at the
hearing. The policy was announced by the Chief Immigra-
tion Judge at the direction of the Attorney General.17 It was
not adopted pursuant to any new authority contained in the
Patriot Act, or pursuant to any pre-existing statutory
authority. Rather, it was defended as an exercise of plenary
executive power in the immigration field.
That policy has now been challenged by newspapers and
others on the grounds that it violates the First Amendment
right of access to court and administrative proceedings.18 In
one particular case, the trial court granted a preliminary
injunction and ordered the deportation proceedings to be
open, on the grounds that there is a likelihood of success on
their claim that the blanket closure of deportation hearings
is unconstitutional. The government appealed, and the
appeals court refused to grant the government a stay of the
order opening the one case, on the grounds that the gov-
ernment failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits.19
Unconstitutional Preventive Detention
There is growing evidence that the government has aban-
doned any effort to comply with the constitutional require-
ment that an individual may only be arrested when there is
probable cause to believe that he is engaged in criminal
activity or is in violation of the immigration statutes. What
we know about the individuals who are in jail is limited, but
we have every reason to believe that only a mere handful of
them have been linked in any way to terrorism or to any of
the hijackers. Indeed the government itself has filed papers
admitting that  it  has  “cleared”  more  than  half of those
individuals of any connection to terrorism. Its own affidavits
in the lawsuits notably fail to allege that any of the detained
individuals are involved in terrorism. On the other hand, it
appears that virtually all the detainees are either Arabs or
Muslims, or believed by the government to be such.
The government has turned the presumption of inno-
cence on its head and is now seeking to jail individuals it
deems suspicious until the FBI can clear them. The FBI has
been providing a form affidavit to the immigration judges
seeking to keep these individuals in jail that relies primarily
on a recitation of the terrible facts of September 11 instead
of containing any facts about the particular individual evi-
dencing any connection to terrorism, much less constitut-
ing probable cause.20 The affidavit simply recites that the
FBI cannot, at this time, exclude the possibility that the
detainee may have some information that could be relevant
to the investigation. In the meantime, the individual is held
in jail.
In carrying out this policy, the government is relying on
legal authorities on the books before September 11 but not
used in this way. First, it has brought minor criminal
charges, such as document fraud or credit card fraud,
against some individuals. The Assistant Attorney General
admitted that these charges would usually not  even  be
prosecuted under prosecutorial guidelines.21 Even if they
were, being charged with such crimes would not have re-
sulted in pretrial detention for a period of time that some-
times exceeds the sentence that would be imposed upon
conviction.
The second basis used for jailing people is the suspicion
that they are in violation of the immigration laws. While the
government’s refusal to reveal the identities of these indi-
viduals makes it difficult to know exactly what is going on,
the government did release a list of the charges brought
against more than seven hundred people. Fewer than five
of those charges relate to terrorism; the majority appear to
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be technical immigration violations, for which individuals
would not have been jailed prior to September 11.
In the immigration context, the Executive Branch has
also claimed new powers unilaterally to hold persons in jail
pretrial on immigration charges. On October 29, without
going through the legislative process and quite apart from
the Patriot Act, the Department of Justice announced a new
regulation that gave it the authority to automatically stay
any bail decision issued in an immigration court.22 The new
rule decreed that when an immigration judge ruled that an
individual should be released on bail, the government could
automatically stay that decision and keep the individual in
jail pending appeal. The government would no longer be
required to persuade an appeals court that it should enter
a stay while the government brought its appeal. It is not
known at this time how often the government has invoked
this authority to keep individuals detained in connection
with its September 11 investigation.
The third basis used for detentions is a pre-existing law
allowing the detention of individuals who have material
information  concerning  a  criminal proceeding.23 Before
September 11 it was a little-used statute that allowed the
government to jail someone who is a material witness in a
criminal case in order to secure his or her testimony at trial.
It specifically requires that before detaining someone, the
government must make every effort to secure his or her
testimony in some other way, for example, by deposition.
The use of the material witness statute since September 11
has been shrouded in secrecy. The government admits that
it has people jailed under that statute; it refuses to say how
many; it has refused to identify which courts have issued
material witness warrants, so that the press and public can
go to those courts to challenge the secrecy orders; and it has
refused to release even the language of the secrecy orders
on which it relies in refusing to release the identities of the
courts that have entered such orders. Instead it has claimed
only that individuals have been jailed as material witnesses
in grand jury proceedings and therefore grand jury secrecy
rules prohibit the release of any information about them.
The identities of those being held as material witnesses and
the basis for holding them are being sought in the Freedom
of Information Act case seeking the names of the jailed
individuals.24
The use of the material witness statute in this way has
also been challenged by an individual who was jailed as a
material witness and then indicted for lying to the grand
jury. The  federal district court in New  York threw out
perjury charges against Osama Awadallah, who had been
held as a material witness in the post-September 11 inves-
tigation, on the ground that his detention was unlawful
because, since 1789, no Congress has granted the govern-
ment the authority to imprison an innocent person in order
to guarantee that he will testify before a grand jury conduct-
ing a criminal investigation.25 The government is likely to
appeal.
All of these circumstances raise serious questions about
the effectiveness of the current effort. Are the Justice De-
partment and the FBI carrying out a focused investigation
with the difficult work necessary to identify and detain
actual terrorists, or is this simply a dragnet, which will only
be successful by chance? The fact that one thousand or even
five thousand individuals in a country with eight million
undocumented immigrants are arrested is no assurance
that the truly dangerous ones are among them.
A final comment: this  is  not such an easy question
politically. It is not a question of balancing the rights of
terrorists versus the security of the rest of us. That would
be easy. Rather, it is a question of balancing the violations
of the rights of others – foreigners, religious and ethnic
minorities – to make the majority feel safer, and that politi-
cally is a much more difficult problem to deal with. It is an
essential problem to deal with so that we do not sacrifice
rights for some illusory notion of security.
Conclusion
In the darkest days of the Cold War we found ways to
reconcile the requirements for security with those of ac-
countability and due process, by taking both interests seri-
ously. No less is required if, in the long run, we expect to be
successful in the fight against terrorists who care nothing for
either human liberty or individual rights.
We need to look closely at how security interests can be
served while respecting civil liberties and human rights. It
is time to give serious consideration to whether promoting
democracy, justice, and human rights will, in the long run,
prove to be a powerful weapon against terrorism along with
law enforcement and military strength. Current U.S. gov-
ernment policy assigns no weight to respecting civil liberties
as useful in the fight against terrorism. But protecting civil
liberties is necessary if we are to be truly effective in what is
likely to be a long and difficult struggle.
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